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STATE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM INTERSTATE
COMMERCE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF AN OLD PROBLEM
by Leonard E. Kust*
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEM
A. Introduction
T HE recent Supreme Court decisions in Nortinvestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota,' Williams v. Stockham Valves e
Fittings, Inc.,' and ET & WNC Transportation Co. v. Currie,' have
elicited unprecedented general interest in state taxation of income
from interstate business.! The direct effect of those decisions has been
to confer constitutional validity on state taxation of the net income
of interstate business from local activities which had been regarded
by many5 as insufficient to sustain such taxation under the federal
constitution. The indirect effect of those decisions has been to alarm
many businessmen and to arouse congressional concern.
* Ph.B., University of Wisconsin; LL.B., Harvard University. Mr. Kust is General Tax
Counsel of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and is the Editor in Chief of The Tax Execu-
tive.
This article is based upon a paper delivered at the Fifth Annual Institute on Taxation
and Estate Planning of the Southwestern Legal Foundation at Dallas, Texas, on September 24,
1959.
The article was prepared with the assistance of John A. Garvey, Jr., a member of the
New York Bar, and Tax Counsel, Planning and Special Projects, Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration.
' 358 U.S. 450 (1959), noted, 14 Sw. L.J. 98 (1960).
2358 U.S. 450 (1959). The Northwestern Cement and Stockham Valves cases were
argued and briefed separately (358 U.S. 450, 452), but a single set of opinions, majority,
concurring, and two dissenting, was delivered covering both cases.
3359 U.S. 28 (1959).
4See The New Grip on Interstate Income, 28 P-H State and Local Tax News (No. 21,
Sec. 2) 1-40 (April 7, 1959); Interstate Income Law, 20 CCH State Tax Review (No. 35,
Extra Ed. Sept. 3, 1959); State Tax Flood Gates Opened, 20 CCH State Tax Review (No.
27, Extra Ed. July 7, 1959); Cox, Impact of the Stockham Decision, 37 Taxes 299 (1959);
Dane, Some Implications of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions on State Taxation of Income
from Interstate Commerce, 26 Tax Policy (Nos. 6-7) (1959); Kust, What New State Levies
on Business Will Mean, 47 Nations' Business (No. 4), digested in 9 Monthly Digest of Tax
Articles 1 (May, 1959); Maun, Stockham, Northwestern States, End Long Fight but Raise
Numerous Business Problems, 10 Journal of Taxation 280 (1959); Silverstein, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce: A First Look at the 'Net Income" Cases, 11 The Tax Executive
200 (1959).
'E.g., the decision in Stockham Valves reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Georgia, 213 Ga. 713, 101 S.E. 2d 197 (1958). See Clark, Interstate Commerce and a
State's Right to Tax: A Rejoinder, 30 Taxes 263 (1952).
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In the cases in question the Court held that a state may impose
a tax on reasonably allocated net income of (1) a foreign corpora-
tion engaged, through one or more employees operating from a local
office, solely in local solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods
subject to acceptance at an extra-state office and filled by shipment
of the goods from outside the state' and (2) a foreign corporation
engaged solely in interstate motor carrier trucking using in connec-
tion therewith local leased terminals.' Thus, for the first time in
specifically articulated decisions the Supreme Court held that the net
income of a foreign corporation could be taxed by a state within
which the only activities of the corporation were interstate commerce.
An appreciation of the meaning and implications of those decisions
requires historical perspective.
B. The Growth of the Net Income Tax
During the past century the income tax has become an increasing-
ly important source of governmental revenue in the United States.
The federal government first imposed a net income tax in 18618 and
continued to do so until 1872.' An attempt was made to reimpose the
federal income tax in 1894,0 but the attempt was thwarted by the
Supreme Court on constitutional grounds." A number of years passed
before the federal income tax was reinstituted, first on corporate
income in 1909,' s and then on income generally in 1913,"3 following
adoption of the sixteenth amendment. Meanwhile, in 1911 Wis-
consin" had become the first state to impose a comprehensive" income
tax. Today, in addition to the federal government, 36 states" and the
District of Columbia impose some sort of net income tax on corpora-
tions. Whether it is sound in economic theory or not, 7 the corporate
' Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 350 U.S. 450 (1959).
7 ET & WNC Transportation Co. v. Currie, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
'Pub. L. No. 40, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 Stat. 292 (1861).
'Pub. L. No. 97, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 432 (1862); Pub. L. No. 148, 38th
Cong., lst Sess., 13 Stat. 223 (1864); Pub. L. No. 164, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Star. 256
(1870).
10Pub. L. No. 227, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
"Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
'2Pub. L. No. 5, 61st Cong., Ist Sess., 36 Stat. 11 (1909).
1
3 Pub. L. No. 16, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
"'Now Wisconsin Laws, c. 71.
"For short periods in the mid-nineteenth century several states imposed primitive in-
come taxes. Altman and Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxation, ch. 1., n.1(1950).
1 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
' See, for example, Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax 141 (1955).
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net income tax has been defended on several pragmatic grounds: (1)
taxation of corporations raises revenues without alienating votes by
reducing taxation of individuals; (2) like any tax which bears on
non-residents as well as on residents, a net income tax which applies
to foreign corporations doing local business pleases residents as being
an appropriate vehicle for spreading the tax base; (3) the net income
tax is often more palatable than property, sales, gross receipts, and
other taxes which have little or no relation to profits; and (4) because
the federal government also imposes a net income tax, administration,
policing, and reporting can be greatly simplified. Yet, there remain
14 states which do not impose a net income tax on corporations.."
C. The Net Income Tax and the Commerce Clause
In framing the Constitution the founding fathers perceived that
unrestricted trade among the states was essential to the health of the
union.'9 To serve this purpose they gave the federal government
power to regulate interstate commerce." Recognizing that the power
to tax was the power to destroy, Chief Justice Marshall in the case
of Brown v. Maryland2 1 in 1827 interpreted the interstate commerce
clause as limiting state power to tax with respect to interstate com-
merce. 2 Since then the role of the Supreme Court, as interpreter of
a living constitution, flexible enough to meet the demands of chang-
ing times, in large measure has been molded through efforts to find
a proper balance between the taxing power of the states and the need
21for a unified national economy.
Commencing in 1918, state income taxes on corporations have
repeatedly been the subject of adjudication before the Supreme
Court. Unhappily, the Court's decisions have produced uncertainty
more often than certainty. As the Court itself pointed out in the
Northwestern Cement case, quoting from an earlier case:
"The Constitution of the State of Florida (Art. IX, § 11) explicitly prohibits the
taxing of income of residents and citizens; a foreign corporation is protected by this pro-
vision as a result of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution. One or more other states (e.g., Illinois) may also be barred inferentially by
their constitutions from imposing a direct net income tax. Most states, however, are not
inhibited by constitutional provisions to impose an income tax.
" Under the Articles of Confederation some of the states had erected intolerable trade
barriers. See State Passenger cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 445 (1848); The Federalist,
Nos. 7, 11 (Hamilton).
'0 U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
2125 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
2 In Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868), it was pointed out that Brown
v. Maryland involved only goods moving from a foreign country into a state. But this did
not alter the influence of the Brown v. Maryland decision in the area of interstate commerce.
23 Mr. Justice Clark in the Northwestern Cement case states that the Court has handed
down some 300 full scale decisions in this field. 358 U.S. 450, 457, 458 (1959).
1960]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
As was said in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344
(1954), the decisions have been not always clear . . . consistent or
reconcilable. A few have been specifically overruled, while others no
longer represent the present state of the law.2"
It was established many years ago by the Supreme Court that a
state may impose on a foreign corporation engaged in both interstate
and intrastate commerce a tax for the privilege of doing business
measured by net income allocable to local activities, even though
some of the income subject to allocation was derived from interstate
commerce. The subject of the tax was treated as being the privilege
of doing intrastate business, and it was deemed immaterial that the
measure of the tax included income from interstate commerce.
Where, however, the corporation was engaged solely in interstate
commerce, a tax on the privilege of doing business was held invalid
as constituting state regulation of interstate commerce." In the
absence of any intrastate business, the subject of the tax was treated
as being the privilege of doing interstate business, so that, regardless
of its measure, the tax was an invalid regulation of interstate com-
merce. The distinction is, at best, subtle. It assumes that the meta-
physical difference between interstate commerce cum local activity
and pure interstate commerce is readily recognizable in the practical
business world. Except in a few clear cases, however, such as sales
through independent sales representatives, mail order businesses, or
broadcasting, almost every interstate business involves some local
activity which can be swept under the category of pure interstate
commerce only by indulging in further metaphysics, such as whether
the conduct of the interstate business is impossible without the local
activity." These distinctions, indeed, provided little practical guid-
ance.
The uncertainty as to taxation of the income of foreign corpora-
tions for the privilege of engaging in selling goods and services across
state lines to local customers posed a problem for states which relied
on the net income tax as a major source of revenue. Sustained by the
hope that the Supreme Court would view direct taxes on net income
differently from privilege taxes measured by net income, several states
enacted general corporate net income statutes and several others en-
acted so-called "second structure" statutes imposing a direct net
24358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
2 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
26Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
27 Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935).
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income tax applicable only to corporations engaged solely in inter-
state commerce.2 8
As the Court observed in the Northwestern Cement case, some
authority for upholding the direct tax on net income could be found
in the language of the Supreme Court as early as 1918 in Peck & Co.
v. Lowe."' That case involved the constitutionality of the federal
income tax as applied to net income from foreign exports. The tax
had been attacked on the ground that, so applied, it violated the con-
stitutional prohibition on taxation of exports from the states." Al-
though the commerce clause was not in question, substitution of the
term "interstate commerce" for the term "exportation" in the fol-
lowing quotation from the opinion in the Peck case is provocative:
At most, exportation is affected only indirectly and remotely. The tax
is levied after exportation is completed, after all expenses are paid and
losses adjusted, and after the recipient of the income is free to use it as
he chooses. 1
The Peck case provided only a hint, however, as to the validity of
the direct net income tax, as applied to income of a business engaged
solely in interstate commerce. It would seem that when faced directly
for the first time with the constitutional issue 28 years later, in 1946,
in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan,5 the Supreme Court should
have devoted considerable discussion to the question. Instead, in up-
holding the tax as applied to West, the Court gave no reasons beyond
the citation of four decisions, thus leaving to speculation the rationale
of its holding.
One of the cases cited in West Publishing Co. was Memphis Natur-
al Gas Co. v. Beeler,3 in which the Court had reaffirmed the rule that
a corporation engaged in some intrastate as well as interstate com-
merce is subject to a privilege tax measured by net income allocable
to local activities. After having held Memphis Natural Gas to have
been engaged in some intrastate commerce, the Court observed by
way of dictum, however, that even if the corporation's activity had
been solely in interstate commerce, the tax was validly applied. It
2 E.g., California (L. of 1937, c. 765), Colorado (c. 175, L. of., 1937), Georgia (Act
330, L. of 1929), Louisiana (Act 21, L. of 1934), Minnesota (c. 405, L. of 1933). "Second
structure" derives from the fact that there was also a privilege tax measured by net income
applicable to domestic corporations and foreign corporations engaged in some intrastate
commerce.
29247 U.S. 165 (1918).
'0 U.S. Const. art 1, § 9, cl. 5.
3'247 U.S. 165, 175 (1918). Of course, this reasoning is as applicable to privilege taxes
measured by net income as to direct taxes on net income (assuming reasonable apportion-
ment).
32328 U.S. 823 (1946).
33315 U.S. 649 (1942).
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may be noteworthy that Memphis Natural Gas was cited in West as
"315 U.S. 649, 656," page 656 being where the dictum appears. Mr.
Justice Harlan emphasized this point in his concurring opinion in
Northwestern Cement.4
The dictum in the Memphis Natural Gas case, that a privilege tax
measured by net income could be applied to a foreign corporation en-
gaged solely in interstate commerce, marked a signal deviation from
existing law, and, coupled with the West decision, seemed to represent
a swing away from the traditional judicial view that a taxpayer en-
gaged locally solely in interstate commerce was protected by the com-
merce clause. In 1951, however, the Supreme Court reverted to
orthodoxy in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor," holding a motor
carrier engaged solely in interestate commerce to be immune from a
privilege tax measured by net income and explicitly stating that the
Memphis Natural Gas dictum was not essential to the decision in
that case.
Less than a decade has passed since the Spector decision was an-
nounced; yet, as a result of the Northwestern Cement, Stockham
Valves, and ET & WNC cases, the Spector opinion is substantially
scuttled.
The Spector decision remains intact as authority with respect to
privilege taxes. It is an isolated symbol of the willingness of the Court
to render obeisance to orthodoxy at the expense of erecting a distinc-
tion devoid of economic reality. Where the business is wholly inter-
state, a tax directly on fairly apportioned net income is valid but a
tax on the privilege of doing business measured by fairly apportioned
net income remains invalid.
The tortuous development of the accommodation between the
commerce clause and the state taxing power having reached its pres-
ent state, one can assume, as the business community has assumed,
that the remaining limitations on privilege taxes are not a meaningful
bar to state taxation of income from interstate business. States with
privilege taxes measured by net income will soon undoubtedly shift
to direct net income taxes."a
Accordingly, the remainder of this article is devoted to the prob-
lems presented by the new scope given to direct taxation by states
of net income from interstate commerce without further reference
to privilege taxes measured by net income.
358 U.S. 450, 468 n.2 (1959).
"340 U.S. 602 (1951).
'o Idaho, Tennessee, and Utah already have taken legislative steps to bring their net in-
come imposts under the Northwestern Cement case. Idaho L. 1959, c. 299; Tenn. L. 1959,
c. 252; Utah L. 1959, c. 13.
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II. PRESENT STATUS OF PROBLEM
The three recent cases fail to provide complete answers. The extent
to which and the manner in which a state may tax net income from
interstate activities without violating the Constitution remain unclear.
A. Minimum Nexus
First is the question of nexus. Clearly, the maintenance of a local
office from which only one solicitor operates is sufficient to permit a
state to tax some income from interstate activities." Is solicitation by
a resident employee working from his home or a personal office suf-
ficient? Is solicitation by a non-resident employee through regular
trips from an out-of-state office sufficient? Would irregular solicita-
tion be sufficient? Would a mail order house be taxable?
It may well be that under the new dispensation the foregoing ques-
tions are not really pertinent in terms of the commerce clause.38 So
long as the taxpayer makes sales to persons located in the taxing juris-
diction and the tax applies to residents and nonresidents alike and is
fairly apportioned to local activity, it is difficult to call the tax itself
a burden on interstate commerce.
The unanswered questions may possibly involve due process under
the fourteenth amendment in that the connection with the state may
be too tenuous to confer jurisdiction to tax"' or to enforce the tax."
They may perhaps be only questions of the wisdom of unrestrained
exercise of the power to tax. Whatever their constitutional status in
the absence of congressional action the questions have become moot
in view of the congressional action already taken, unless this action
is itself held to be unconstitutional."
B. Proper Allocation of Income
It seems clear that in the case of a foreign corporation a state should
be able to tax only income attributable to activity within the taxing
jurisdiction. This is certainly a commerce clause question," as well as
"'Cf. Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
38 Cf. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958),
appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 28 (1959); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279,
107 So.2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
" By specifically finding that the activities in the state were sufficient to satisfy due
process in the Northwestern Cement and Stockham Valve cases, the Court leaves the impli-
cation that lesser activities might raise a due process question. 358 U.S. at 450, 464, 465
(1959).
40 See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 322 U.S. 335, 339 (1944) (dissenting
opinion); but cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41 The congressional action and its constitutional validity will be discussed more fully
hereinafter.
4'Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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a question of state jurisdiction to tax, either in terms of the due pro-
cess clause" or the common law." In the absence of uniform allocation
methods which fairly reflect the amount of income properly attribut-
able to local operations, the income base is in part duplicated by two
or more states.
This danger of duplication is not merely theoretical; it is real. The
allocation formula most commonly used is based on the average of
the ratios of local payroll, property, and sales, to total payroll, prop-
erty, and sales. There are many variations in the factors. For example,
some states omit payroll from the formula, substituting manufactur-
ing cost."' Other states omit property and payroll from the formula,
leaving only sales.46 In addition, local sales are defined variously in
terms of place of origin," place of destination," place of negotiation,"
and other standards so that the same sale may be considered to be
"local" by two or more states.
While multiple taxes resulting from the diversity of allocation
formulas among the states clearly raise a commerce clause question,
it is difficult to see how the Supreme Court can resolve it. The prac-
tical procedure would be to hale before the Court the competing
states whose diverse allocation formulas result in multiple taxation
of the taxpayer's net income and require them to reconcile their
allocations in a way which eliminates the multiple burden. There is,
however, no established judicial procedure for such action."
Absent such forthright action, the Supreme Court would have to
judge the burden imposed on interstate commerce by a state's formula
in a two-party action brought by the taxpayer. The Supreme Court
could look at the formula before it on its own merits and, if reason-
able, let the tax stand." Assuming the other states have reasonable,
although diverse, formulas, their taxes could then be no more suc-
43 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
44 See Hays v. The Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (18s5), which dealt
with a property tax. While the common law ground appears to be unimportant since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it is mentioned here in view of Mr. Justice Black's
conclusion, stated in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90
(1938), that the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable to corporations.
4' E.g., Wisconsin.
46 E.g., Iowa.
47 E.g., New York.
4' E.g., Colorado.
40 E.g., Pennsylvania .
" It is probable that the taxpayer is barred by the eleventh amendment from taking
such action to bring the competing states before a federal court. Worchester County Trust
Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). It is doubtful that a state could show the jeopardy
necessary to permit an original suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader against competing
states in the Supreme Court. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
"' The Court's action on allocation formulas in past cases may suggest that this would
be the approach. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
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cessfully attacked. The burden on interstate commerce, although
clearly incurred, would remain judicially undisturbed.
In the alternative, the Supreme Court could consider the formula
of the first state brought before it in conjunction with the formulas
of the other state or states involved. Although the formula is reason-
able on its own merits, the Court could hold that its contribution to
creating a multiple tax burden on the interstate income of the tax-
payer rendered its application invalid under the commerce clause.
This would remove the burden on interstate commerce, but why
should the first state be the only one deprived of revenue, assuming
that removal of its tax is enough to eliminate multiple taxation, thus
protecting the remaining state or states from attack? What action
can the first state take to get its fair share of the revenue from the
interstate income of the taxpayer involved? This would seem to be,
indeed, a heavy and uneven handed way of dealing with the compet-
ing claims of states for apportionment of interstate income.
Thus, while a commerce clause question clealy remains inherent
in the diversity among allocation formulas, its judicial resolution is
unclear.
C. Compliance Cost
Finally, the cost of compliance with the income tax statutes of
several states borne by interstate business may be so unreasonably
large as compared with the compliance cost of intrastate business
that this cost in itself constitutes a burden on interstate commerce.
Much was made of this point by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dis-
sent in the Northwestern Cement case5" and by witnesses in hearings
before the Senate Committee on Finance5 and the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business."
It is apparent that to the extent that interstate business is required
to file one or more tax returns which need not be filed by intrastate
business, there is a cost of compliance incurred by interstate business
which exceeds the cost of compliance incurred by intrastate business.
Such excess cost is, however, merely a necessary cost of doing inter-
state business and cannot properly be treated as a burden on inter-
state commerce. A contrary conclusion would free interstate business
from the reasonable obligation of bearing its fair share of the tax bill.
The cost of compliance can, and does, become excessive where the
increase is caused not only by the necessity of filing a return but by
"358 U.S. 450, 474 (1959).
"See S. Rep. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
14 See S. Rep. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
19601
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
diverse statutory allocation formulas and tax bases. It is this element
of cost of compliance which can properly be regarded as imposing an
unconstitutional burden.
It is doubtful that excessive cost of compliance, however meaning-
ful it may be in terms of discussion of burdens on interstate com-
merce, is susceptible of judicial remedy. If the cost of complying with
the tax statute of state A alone is not excessive and the cost of com-
plying with the tax statute of state B alone is not excessive, can the
tax of either state be declared invalid by the court merely because
the cost of complying with the statutes of both states is excessive?
The problem is analogous to that set forth regarding allocation
formulas and appears equally incapable of judicial solution.
D. End of an Era?
It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court was fully aware of the
ultimate implications of its action. The Court was moved by the logic
of current imperatives in fixing a new modus operandi for state taxa-
tion of net income from interstate commerce. But did it consider and
accept that at the same time it rendered itself substantially impotent
under the new regime to perform its traditional function of policing
and applying through particular cases the remaining constitutional
limitations on state power to tax income from interstate commerce?
The question of nexus falls within the traditional pattern of indi-
vidual case adjudication at the behest of the taxpayer. But the ques-
tions of burden on interstate commerce, through multiple tax and
excessive compliance cost, raised by overlapping and dissimilar tax
bases and allocation formulas, are not amenable to the judicial process.
Perhaps the Court did contemplate these implications"' and accepted
them as unavoidable, justifying its acceptance of them as its final act
in forcing Congress to cope with the matter, which Congress had
been invited to do in several prior cases."
Whether it was done consciously or unconsciously, it is fair to
conclude that, unless it reverses itself, the Supreme Court has abdi-
cated, for all practical purposes, from any further useful function in
the field of state taxation of net income from interstate commerce."
"It was probably Mr. Justice Frankfurter's partly articulated cognizance of the prac-
tical incapacity of the Supreme Court to deal with these problems that led him in his
dissenting opinion to make a strong plea for congressional action. 358 U.S. at 450, 475, 476.
5Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302 (1944) (concurring
opinion); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (dissenting opinion); Mc-
Carroll v. Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
" The Supreme Court may be required to pass on the constitutional validity of Pub. L.
86-272, 73 Stat. 555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), enacted by Congress in the last session.
If it should find this action unconstitutional it will merely add to the problems of multiple
I[Vol. 14
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Consequently, the problem must hereafter be viewed as one of
legislative policy to be implemented by Congress and state legislatures.
III. A STUDY OF SOLUTIONS
If the judiciary is impotent to deal with the remaining constitu-
tional problems involved in state taxation of income from interstate
commerce, these problems must be dealt with through some other
governmental procedure. Before some new procedure is invoked there
should be a consensus as to the substance of the solution to these
problems.
A. Nexus-The Wisdom of Restraint
In view of the legal sophistry surrounding the question of min-
imum nexus in its narrow constitutional context, a broader approach
is called for. It is instructive to examine in this respect the pattern
of federal and international income taxation of foreign corporations.
Between 1916 and 1936 the federal government took a bold atti-
tude, taxing foreign corporations on all their income from sources
within the United States. 8 Because there is no limitation on the juris-
diction of a nation to tax except that nation's power to collect the
tax, there is no theoretical objection to this far-reaching method of
taxing foreign corporations.
It was found, however, that the scope of taxation of foreign cor-
porations had been defined with such breadth that the system of
taxation of foreign corporations was "a theoretical system impractical
of administration in a great number of cases.""9 In other words, the
government had imposed taxes which it was unable to collect except
on a fortuitous basis.
Reformation was called for, and, accordingly, commencing with
the Revenue Act of 1936"0 only a foreign corporation engaged in
tax and excessive compliance cost with which it cannot effectively deal. If it approves it will
eliminate nexus as a constitutional problem but still leave the multiple tax and excessive
compliance cost problems.
" E.g., Revenue Act of 1934, 55 119, 231(a), 232, 48 Stat. 716, 737 (1934).
59 H.R. Rep. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10 (1936).
" Revenue Act of 1936, § 231(a), (b), 49 Stat. 1717 (1936). These provisions appear
presently in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 881, 882. There have been some amend-
ments. In 1942, the definition of "resident," which had included a corporation maintaining
a United States office, was limited to those engaged in trade or business within the United
States. Revenue Act of 1942, § 160(d), 55 Stat. 694 (1942). Peculiarly, the amendment,
which had the apparent effect of diminishing the number of corporations treated as being
resident, was enacted to increase revenue. Certain corporations having income from sources
within the United States had established nominal United States offices in order to be taxed
on net income as resident corporations rather than on gross income as nonresident corpora-
tions. The tax differential between domestic corporations and resident foreign corporations
was abolished in 1951. Revenue Act of 1951, S 121(g), 65 Star. 409 (1951).
1960]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
trade or business in the United States is taxed on its United States
source income in the same manner in which a domestic corporation
is taxed. All other foreign corporations are taxed only on specified
items of income from sources within the United States,"' and those
items coincide with the items of income from which payors are re-
quired to withhold federal income tax."5
In addition to the requirement that a foreign corporation be en-
gaged in trade or business within the United States, the rules as to
source of income are a limiting factor. A foreign corporation which
sells to United States customers is not subject to tax even if it is en-
gaged in trade or business in the United States unless it transfers title
within the United States."' Thus, under a combination of the nexus
and source of income rules, assuming that title can be readily trans-
ferred outside the United States, a foreign corporation which sells
from stocks of goods outside the United States is not subject to
United States taxation.
The United States has taken steps beyond the Internal Revenue
Code with respect to taxation of foreign enterprises and has entered
into bilateral treaties with 21 nations relating to income taxes."
Under each of those treaties the United States and the other signatory
nation limit the exercise of taxing power over a business enterprise of
the other country. An enterprise of one country is not subject to tax
on industrial or commercial profits in the other country unless the
enterprise is engaged in trade or business through a permanent estab-
lishment located in the other country.
The treaties define "permanent establishment" generally as includ-
ing a branch office, warehouse, or other fixed place of business, but
not including (1) the making of sales through a local commission
agent; (2) maintenance of a purchasing office; (3) maintenance of
a local subsidiary; or (4) maintenance of an agent, other than an
agent who has, and habitually exercises, general power to negotiate
and conclude contracts or who regularly fills orders from a local
stock of goods.
The definition of "permanent establishment" as a minimum nexus
is not as clear as it could be,6' and conceivably could be interpreted
61 Revenue Act of 1936, 231(a), (b), 49 Stat. 1717 (1936).6 2 Revenue Act of 1936, 5 144, 49 Stat. 1702 (1936).
8' U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957).
64 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom.
"a Neither existing Treasury Regulations nor decided cases give any useful hint of the
definition which will be applied to the term "permanent establishment." While the regula-
tions promulgated under some of the treaties contain definitions of the term which are
more meaningful than the treaty expressions, there remains a wide area for dispute.
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to require the execution of the contract of sale within the United
States, in which case the treaties would enlarge on the restraint of the
Internal Revenue Code in taxing foreign corporations.
Thus through bilateral treaties and unilateral legislative action the
federal government has placed substantial limitations on the exercise
of its power to tax foreign enterprises.
The decision of Congress to limit its exercise of taxing power over
foreign corporations to cases in which the tax can be enforced is
worthy of consideration in determining a sound limit on the powers
of the states to tax income from interstate activity. If a tax cannot be
collected from all taxpayers which are theoretically subject to the tax,
collection of the tax from some is unfair. It is unsound for a state
to attempt to tax beyond the limit of effective enforcement.
The underlying principle of the treaties is the elimination or miti-
gation of double taxation. In dealing with industrial and commercial
profits the treaties attempt to meet the problem solely in terms of
nexus and do not employ the possible approach of apportionment of
income. If the foreign taxpayer does not transact its business through
a local permanent establishment, its income is wholly relieved of local
tax on a reciprocal basis as a means of mitigating double taxation.
Under the Internal Revenue Code as has been pointed out, the nexus
approach, coupled with the title-passage aspect of the source of
income rules, leads to a similar result.
While there may be much to justify the federal government's hav-
ing so restricted its taxing power over foreign corporations, there is
no sound reason for the states to be so restricted by what is essentially
an all-or-nothing demarcation. In the interstate income area nexus
does not have to serve the function of avoiding double taxation. The
apportionment of income is well established for this purpose and the
double or multiple tax problem can be adequately solved by improv-
ing apportionment. In the interstate income field the fixing of a
minimum nexus can thus be freed of playing a role in the elimination
of multiple taxation and can be approached solely as a question of
wise restraint of the exercise of the power to tax at the point where
effective and even enforcement ceases.
Accordingly, it is suggested that, as a minimum standard, a state
should not impose an income tax on businesses whose activities within
the state are so slight as to make it difficult for the state tax adminis-
trators to become aware of these activities. If the taxpayer operates
by mail order or solely through traveling solicitors and has no office
in the state, the possibility that the taxpayer's presence will come to
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the attention of the tax administrators is in many cases remote. On
the other hand, a local office or other place of business should be suf-
ficient to put state tax authorities exercising a reasonable amount of
diligence on notice of the taxpayer's presence, permitting even en-
forcement. The maintenance of an office or other place of business
therefore provides a reasonable minimum nexus.
B. Allocation of Taxable Income
In addition to the "nexus approach" to mitigation of double taxa-
tion under our international tax treaties and the nexus plus source
of income rules under the Internal Revenue Code,"6 there are several
other possibilities for alleviating multiple taxation of interstate in-
come. There is the possibility of taxing all of the income and provid-
ing a credit for net income taxes imposed by other jurisdictions as is
done under the Internal Revenue Code with respect to domestic cor-
porations. This does not, however, appear to be an apt solution in
the interstate field,"' since it can be properly implemented by a state
only with respect to corporations organized under its laws,"6 and the
main problem is with respect to foreign, not domestic, corporations.
Another possibility, employed by a number of foreign countries,"
is to allocate income earned within a state by administrative deter-
mination based upon separate accounting or direct appraisal of the
contribution to the earning of income made by activities within and
without the state. It is precisely because of the difficulties inherent in
this approach that the allocation formulas now so widely used by the
states were devised.6
All things considered, although allocation formulas are not as
mathematically certain as they appear to be, they are still superior
to other approaches. None of the possibilities is capable of perfect
elimination of double or multiple taxation of international or inter-
state income, but the mathematical allocation formula has promise
in this respect that none of the other approaches possesses. Unlike
other approaches, a formula is susceptible of uniform application and,
given a uniform formula applied by all the taxing jurisdictions in-
66 Nexus plus source of income is also, in effect, the approach employed by a number of
other countries. For example: Burma, Canada, Ceylon, India, Pakistan.
67 The states of Alabama and Louisiana tax all the income of domestic corporations but
permit a credit against the tax for income tax paid to other states. Ala. Code tit. 51, §§ 390,
398 (1940); La. Rev. Stat., tit. 47, §§ 33, 161 (1950).
6" Under the Internal Revenue Code the federal government denies the credit for
foreign income taxes to foreign corporations. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 882 (c) (4).
69 E.g., Switzerland and India. This is also provided as an alternative to the allocation
formula in most state statutes.
70 See Blakey & Johnson, State Income Taxes 63-64 (1942).
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volved, there is, for all practical purposes, complete elimination of
double or multiple income taxation."1
In addition to mitigating multiple taxation of interstate income, a
uniform allocation formula would substantially eliminate excessive
compliance costs occasioned by the present diversity of such formulas.
The Supreme Court has approved the use of an allocation formula
as a reasonable means of determining the amount of interstate income
subject to tax"2 and it is submitted that the allocation formula ap-
proach commends itself as the best approach to the avoidance of
multiple taxation of interstate income.
Admittedly, it is impossible to devise a perfect uniform allocation
formula. A formula in inherently arbitrary. The task is to devise a
formula which on the whole most satisfactorily weights the in-state
and out-of-state income producing activities and minimizes distortion.
There must be provision, however, where distortion is asserted for
taxpayers or administrators to prove by other means, if they can, a
more accurate and acceptable apportionment, in which case the
formula would not be applied.
As a starting point, it is suggested that some sort of three-factor
formula is a minimum requirement. Fewer than three factors in-
creases the probabilities of distortion in particular cases. Indeed, more
than three factors would be desirable from this point of view; but,
the choice of additional factors involves more administrative and
compliance costs and new questions of the weight to be given to in-
state and out-of-state activities. The three factors, viz., property,
payroll, and sales, have acquired acceptance and are on sound middle
ground.
Production, warehousing, and to some extent selling and adminis-
trative operations, require property investment, and thus the property
factor reflects one of the major income-producing aspects of a busi-
ness. The payroll factor also reflects production, warehousing, selling
and administrative activities, but weights them differently and is
thus also a desirable factor. Neither factor reflects adequately, how-
ever, the importance of selling activity in the earning of income.
The argument that income is earned only by services and by prop-
erty so that payroll and property should be the only allocation factors
is not persuasive. It is anchored in classical economic analysis of the
factors of production.7 This analysis is not appropriate to the deter-
" A uniform tax base is also required as discussed hereinafter.
72 Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
72 See, e.g., Harriss, Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business Income, 37
Taxes 327 (1959).
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mination of where net income arises for tax purposes. Taxation is a
pragmatic matter which should deal with the business world on its
own terms. Factually it is selling which converts the goods produced
into the income which is taxed, and the business world clearly regards
selling activity as contributing substantially to net income.
Where does selling income arise? Is it, as would be the case if only
the payroll and property factors were used, merely where the personal
services of salesmen are rendered and the facilities used by them are
located? Not by the traditional standards applied in income taxa-
tion by the federal government and most nations. Income from sales
of personal property is generally considered to arise where the sales
transaction is effected. Since the transaction requires a buyer as well
as the seller this generally means that the income has its source partly
in the country of the buyer and partly in the country of the seller.7'
It would seem clear therefore that there is a sound basis for including
the sales factor in a uniform allocation formula."' At least 24 of the
states use both property and payroll as factors in allocation," and of
77the 24 states using property and payroll as factors, all expect one,
also use sales as a third factor.
Accordingly, a formula employing the three factors (property,
payroll, and sales) merits first consideration in framing a uniform
allocation formula.
A uniform definition of the property and payroll fractions would
require some accommodation by the states in view of presesnt varia-
tions but no serious problems are apparent.78 The sales fraction, on
the other hand, being the source of the greatest diversity, presents the
most serious problems.
"' Of course not all countries choose to tax the seller on his income simply because the
buyer is located in the country, but this is a question of minimum nexus rather than where
the income arises. Some countries, like the United States, choose one aspect of the trans-
action, as where title passes, in fixing the source of the income, but this is in the interest of
certainty and convenience. Conceptually, however, once the transaction approach is taken,
the situs of the buyer must logically be given consideration in determining where the in-
come from the transaction arises.
7' Indeed, it could be argued that the use of both a property and a payroll factor unduly
weights the manufacturing activity. The regulations under the Internal Revenue Code em-
ploy a formula applying a property factor to one-half the income and a sales factor to the
other half, thus ascribing one-half of the income to selling. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 (c) (3).
76 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. South Carolina is
also included in this enumeration, although until January 1, 1960, there will be variations
as between certain taxpayers under South Carolina law.
'7 Alaska.
78 The most important item of diversity in the property factor is the treatment of rented
property. Some states capitalize rent. Conn. Rev. Stat. § 12-208; N.Y. State Income Tax
Reg. Art. 412. Capitalization of rent would appear to minimize possible distortions.
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What definition is to be used for the sales numerator?
In seeking an answer the "Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act" adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association commands
attention. Under section 16 of that act, sales are generally assigned
to the state of destination.
Accepting the analysis heretofore made of minimum nexus and
the justification of including the sales factor in the allocation formula
it would appear logically and practically necessary to conclude that
the numerator of the sales fraction should be based on the destination
of the product sold.
If it is sound to fix the minimum nexus at the point where the
foreign corporation maintains an office in the state from which sales
are solicited, it makes little sense to define the numerator of the sales
fraction as anything but sales to customers located in the state."9 The
property and payroll fractions will yield insignificant allocation of
income to such a state. Consequently, the sales factor should be de-
fined to recognize that approval of the exercise of the taxing power
is meaningless unless revenue results.
Likewise, if inclusion of the sales factor in the allocation formula
is justified as reflecting that income arises from the sales transaction,
the sales factor should be defined to recognize that the income arises
in part from the state of the buyer. The payroll and property factors
give insignificant weight to this. It is appropriate, therefore, that the
sales factor give it primary weight.
The merit of a uniform allocation formula should also be judged
by ease of compliance since reduction of compliance costs is one of
its major purposes. Judging the sales factor by this standard again
recommends the destination basis. The keeping of records and process-
ing of sales data to determine sales allocation would require little
effort on a destination basis. The manner in which most companies'
sales records are normally kept make them readily susceptible of de-
termination of destination. Indeed sales analyses on a market basis are
likely to be made for management purposes in any event and can be
used directly for tax purposes, thus requiring no special effort. This is
not likely to be the case with other standards for the sales factor.
Administrative audit of the sales factor would for similar reasons
be facilitated by use of the destination basis. A test period audit of
" There are no doubt eminent authorities ready to challenge this confident statement.
Studenski and Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, 36 Harv. Bus. Rev., May
1958, p. 77; Murphy, testimony, Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Small Business
on State Taxation on Interstate Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 327-28 (1959).
1960]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
invoices could be made as in sales tax auditing. Indeed, sales and
income tax audits could in this respect be combined at a saving in
administration costs.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that a uniform three-
factor formula based on property, payroll, and sales, with the numera-
tor of the sales fraction determined by destination, provides the best
solution to mitigation of multiple taxes and excessive compliance
costs.
C. The Tax Base
In addition to wide variations in allocation formulas, a source of
excessive cost of compliance results from variations in the tax base.
At present, although the tendency is to define taxable income in
terms which approximate taxable income for federal income tax
purposes, there are many differences. If reduction in the cost of com-
pliance is to be maximized, there must be a uniform definition of
taxable income.
The most obvious method of achieving uniformity is to define
taxable income as it is defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Every
business corporation must file a federal income tax return. " If the
uniform definition of taxable income corresponds to the federal de-
finition, most if not all of the accounting necessary to determine tax-
able income will have been performed in preparing the federal return,
thus minimizing that portion of the cost of compliance.
In using federal net income as a uniform base, some adjustments
might be necessary where the fourteenth amendment or some other
constitutional provision requires adjustment, as probably would be
the case with respect to rental income from real property and tangible
personal property. Careful consideration should be given to whether
any such adjustments are really required, and they should be kept
to the unavoidable minimum.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLUTION
The essence of the foregoing discussion is uniformity: uniformity
in fixing minimum nexus, uniformity in allocation formulas, and
uniformity in definitions of the tax base. In view of the present lack
of uniformity, achieving uniformity necessarily implies action.
A. Current Congressional Action
Action with respect to minimum nexus has, with remarkable
80 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6012 (a) (2).
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alacrity, already been taken. Public Law 86-272" was passed without
hearings by the House Judiciary Committee and with only brief hear-
ings before the Senate Finance Committee. Both houses, no doubt,
had the benefit of the more extensive hearings before the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Small Businss, but these hearings were oriented to
only a sector of interstate commerce.
In view of the previous absence of tangible congressional interest
in this problem, the complexities of the problem, and the important
federal-state governmental relations involved, the precipitate action
taken does not inspire confidence in the result.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the act finally passed is equiv-
ocal on a central issue: May the taxpayer maintain a local office
from which solicitors operate and yet be protected by the statute
from taxation? The statute on its face appears to give such protection,
but the legislative history reveals a clear intention to permit the
states to tax in such circumstances. No doubt this intention will pre-
vail, but the lack of any indication of the intent on the face of the
statute is deplorable.
The statute is also unclear with respect to what are "business activ-
ities." Conceivably installation, local advertising, local collections,
and other local activities are "business activities." Since these are not
included in the specifically protected activities, if engaged in, they
may leave open to tax a business otherwise engaged only in solicita-
tion. This problem is inherent in the Senate approach incorporated in
the act as passed, which defines 'when the state may not tax. The
House bill,8" which defined when states may tax, would avoid this
problem. From the point of view of interfering with the power of
states to tax, however, the Senate approach appears less dictatorial in
that it merely says when states may not tax.
Another defect of the statute is that it deals with only one aspect
of interstate commerce, sales of tangible personalty. Interstate car-
riers, pipelines, radio, and television, for example, are not protected
by the statute.
In spite of the unseemly haste and the imperfections of the con-
gressional action, it would appear on the basis of the analysis hereto-
fore made that the line demarking minimum nexus was soundly
drawn, assuming the statute will be interpreted to permit a state to
tax interstate income only where there is at least a sales solicitation
office within the state. In any event Congress is now committed to
s 86th Cong., 1st Sess., (signed by the President, September 14, 1959), 73 Stat. 555
(1959).
65S. 2524 (House Amendment), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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action, and if the imperfections of the statute as passed are serious in
practice, amendment can correct them.
B. Future Required Action
While the action of Congress covered only minimum nexus, the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Judiciary Committee were
directed to study all matters pertaining to the taxation of income
from interstate commerce and to report proposals for legislation by
July 1, 1962. s3
What can or should the proposals be? Proposals for eliminating
multiple taxation cannot be implemented by Congress alone as can
minimum nexus. Even if Congress fixes the standards there has to be
responsive legislative action by the states. Should this be a deterrent
to action by Congress? Consideration of the alternatives if Congress
takes no action provides a ready answer.
Compacts between the states have been noted as a possibility,"4 but
no action has ever been undertaken in this direction. Interstate com-
pacts would seem to be wholly impractical as a solution.
The only other alternative permitting solution by state action
alone is adoption of a uniform act.
For 40 years the National Tax Association has striven for uniform-
ity in state taxation of corporate net income through a uniform act."5
In 1957 The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association ap-
proved a uniform act which had been approved shortly before by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Yet nothing has been done by the states. On this record the con-
clusion that congressional action is required is unavoidable.
If congressional action is to be taken, what course should be fol-
lowed?
One suggestion, made a number of years ago, is that taxes should
be collected by the federal government and then funneled back to
the states.8 Whatever one's personal views regarding federal-state re-
lations may be, it must be recognized that this suggestion would be
unacceptable to a very large portion of Congress and, therefore, is
quite impracticable.
Another form of congressional action might be framed by analogy
to the credits provided under the federal estate tax8' and unemploy-
83Pub. Law 86-272, § 201.
84Dane, Hearings, supra note 79, at 18; Groves, Hearings, supra note 79, at 67-68.
s5 See, e.g., National Tax Association, Proceedings of the Annual Conference 193 (1939).
88 Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation, 44 Yale L.J. 1166 (193 5).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2011.
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ment tax." Congress could provide that taxpayers which pay income
taxes to those states which have complied with uniform principles
set forth in a congressional statute may credit the state taxes, within
a stated maximum,8' against federal income taxes. Aside from the
mechanical difficulties inherent in such a program there is implicit
in the program a virtual bribing of all states to impose a net income
tax. Fourteen states have to date seen fit to forebear imposing a
corporate net income tax. Congressional action along these lines does
not present an attractive prospect.
There remains the possibility of action by Congress which directly
sets forth a uniform allocation formula and tax base to be used by
states in imposing a net income tax on interstate commerce. This is
certainly less an impairment of state's rights than is the minimum
nexus legislation. The latter carves out an area of potential revenue
from the states' power to tax; the former permits taxation but
merely fixes in part the manner in which the tax shall be imposed.
Thus the suggested action should be easier to accept than the action
already taken. It is certainly just as essential in assuring the unim-
peded development of a national economy to which the sovereignty
of the states must be subordinated as contemplated by the commerce
clause of the Constitution.
It is to be hoped therefore that Congress will meet its responsibility
and complete its action in this area by enacting a statute setting forth
a uniform allocation formula and tax base along the lines discussed
which must be used by the states in taxing income from interstate
activity. The states would then have to pass correlated statutes or
forego taxing income from interstate business.
C. Constitutionality of Current and Required Action
There is conceivably a question as to the constitutionality of the
action already taken by Congress on minimum nexus and as to the
action suggested for elimination of multiple taxation and excessive
compliance cost. Reasonable action by Congress will no doubt be up-
held by the Supreme Court. Had the Senate Finance Committee bill
been passed restricting tax jurisdiction to cases where there was a
stock of goods in the state or where contracts of sale were executed
in the state, the Supreme Court may well have held that Congress
exceeded its authority to legislate. Having finally drawn the line of
minimum nexus where it has, it would seem clear that the Supreme
"8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 3302.
89Absent a maximum percentage, the remote possibility would exist that a reckless state




Court will, if required to pass on the matter, uphold the statute as
fixing a reasonable standard.
The case for the constitutional validity of a statute setting forth a
uniform allocation formula and tax base would seem even clearer.
This action is directed to removing a burden on interstate commerce
and consequently is well within the scope of regulation of interstate
commerce which is reserved to Congress. There would accordingly
appear to be no constitutional impediment to the additional congres-
sional action recommended.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions and the congressional action taken
this year have brought state income taxation of interstate business
to front and center stage prominence. Many interstate businesses and
their tax advisers have struggled for years ingloriously backstage
with the problems of multiplicity and excessive compliance cost
under the old rules. The minimum nexus legislation is a relief measure
primarily for small business. But there is now genuine hope that the
bulk of interstate business which was taxable before the Supreme
Court decisions and remains taxable under the new legislation may
reap the benefits of additional congressional action designed to attain
uniformity.
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